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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SAVA 73-18

9 March 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Laurin B. Askew  
Director, Vietnam Working Group  
Department of State

SUBJECT : Suggested Changes in 3/8/73 Draft  
Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger

1. Appended as an annex is a substitute for your draft's first two pages -- a substitute offered for your consideration.

2. On your Option 1, I would add the following as a final sentence to the "TIMING" paragraph:

In fact, we recommend that such a step be initiated immediately by whatever private channels are deemed most appropriate.

3. On Option 3, I would suggest inserting the parenthetical phrase "(separate ones)" after the first word ("Representations").

4. On Option 5, add one more "con":

-- The signal to Hanoi that we were serious would probably be considerably clearer if we confined ourselves to strong, private approaches to Hanoi, Moscow and Peking.

5. On Option 6, again add one more "con":

-- Our taking this tack would probably be read in Hanoi as a sign that we were blustering and did not contemplate serious, drastic action. CLASS

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## 6. Same on Option 7:

-- Again, Hanoi would see us as being more interested in complaining than in acting.

## 7. On Option 8:

## a. State Option as follows:

Reveal in detail for public knowledge the record of North Vietnamese infiltration of men and supplies, and use of Laos, in violation of the Agreement. This could be done by issuing a carefully prepared "White Paper," a formal State Department, Defense Department or White House briefing, or some combination of these and/or other means.

## b. Add one more "pro":

-- Our "going public" would lay the groundwork and rationale for any subsequent military action we might decide to take. Also, Hanoi would probably read this move as being designed to prepare public opinion for a resumption of military action.

## c. I have troubles with the stated judgment on timing and would prefer language along the following lines:

Though there is some risk that our making such a public charge might complicate the release of U.S. prisoners, Hanoi would be hard put to justify holding back on prisoner releases simply because we were complaining about alleged North

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Vietnamese violations. We would recommend that at least some overt manifestation of U.S. Government concern -- which, in the process, would start getting the situation before the public -- be initiated immediately. Our public statements here can then be orchestrated with our private approaches to Hanoi, Moscow and Peking.

8. Option 10:

- a. First "pro," I suggest you substitute "harassing" for "threatening" (before "tone").
- b. Third "pro," after "actions," suggest you substitute: "or perhaps modify them (though it is unlikely that psyops alone could produce this result)."

9. Military Option 8, in first "pro" for "infiltration" substitute:


"the movement of Communist supplies and forces within South Vietnam."

  
George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

O/DCI/SAVA:GACarver/mee

Orig - Addressee

- 1 -  (Options paper) *w/ basics*
- 1 - GAC Chrono ✓

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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Further Studies for WSAG: Options to Inhibit NVA Military  
Buildup in South Viet-Nam

In accordance with the instructions levied at the WSAG meeting on March 6 and in your subsequent memorandum, a special Ad Hoc Group with representatives from the Secretary of Defense's office, the JCS, the NSC Staff, the CIA and the Department of State have considered the question of military and diplomatic/political moves to (a) inhibit North Vietnamese infiltration of military supplies and personnel into South Viet-Nam and (b) to inhibit the attendant development -- in violation of the Paris Agreement -- of a North Vietnamese capability to launch new large-scale military operations in South Viet-Nam.

In considering its recommendations, the group was asked to weigh carefully and comment on the need for instituting actions, particularly ones which might complicate Hanoi's release of U.S. prisoners, before 28 March -- i.e., X + 60 or the day which all U.S. POWs are to be released -- as opposed to deferring such actions until after the prisoners were out.

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In addressing possible U.S. counteraction, the group took cognizance of the fact that the rationale and purpose of Hanoi's current activities are obscure. The major resupply and personnel infiltration effort now in train may reflect an attempt to refurbish Communist forces in South Vietnam and bring them up to something approaching pre-30 March 1972 capabilities by taking maximum advantage of the current dry season and the restraints Hanoi may feel the U.S. will impose on itself until the end of the prisoner release period. (Hanoi's planners, in short, may be trying to exploit the coincidence involved in the fact that the dry season will be ending soon after the prisoner release period is over.) If this line of reasoning is correct, the supply and personnel flow now in train could be a surge effort that -- whatever we do or do not do -- will taper off markedly by, say, mid-April. Conversely -- or simultaneously -- Hanoi may be (and probably is) probing to test the limits of our tolerance, with the thought that if the Communists get away with their post-28 January violations, a new norm or plateau of "accepted" behavior will be established, which Hanoi can use or cite as a precedent in the future.

As other joint intelligence assessments have noted, the Hanoi Politburo has probably not definitively made up its own mind with respect to what policies to pursue over the balance of this year. At a minimum, however, Hanoi is clearly endeavoring to make and/

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or keep the military option a credible and viable one in case primarily political competition proves unpromising. In this paper, we make no definitive judgment or assumption concerning Hanoi's longer term intentions but, instead, concentrate on steps designed to deter Hanoi from improving its military position in the south by gross violations of the Paris Agreements.

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